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INTRODUCTION
This global survey was written to demonstrate the fact that within
almost every country of the world with an organized government, there
exists some means by which citizens may redress grievances of fundamen-
tal rights violations. The present emphasis in world affairs has been on
organizing sanctions exterior to the governmental structures of nation-
states through such august bodies as the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of American States. However, such sanctions do not effectively and
efficiently aid those who require the greatest protection: the citizens of
nation-states themselves.
This survey attempts to show the philosophic and functional similar-
ity between various nations with diverse governmental organization and
geographic location. It is divided into two major parts. The first part is an
examination of legislative enactments, primarily constitutional provisions,
for the protection of certain fundamental human rights and an examina-
tion of judicial bodies where citizens may bring such violations to the at-
tention of the courts for their resolution. The second part examines the
executive branch as a possible source of non-judicial redress, or alterna-
tively, as a vehicle to prevent fundamental rights violations in a prophy-
lactic capacity. This latter method is examined through the Ombudsman
model which has been established in Scandinavia and utilized in various
capacities throughout Europe and certain developing nations.
Part One of this survey, concerning legislative enactments and the
judiciary, is divided into five sections: (1) conceptualization and classifica-
tion of domestic instruments; (2) Anglo-American instruments for the en-
forcement of fundamental rights guarantees; (3) the special system in
Latin America; (4) the system of continental Europe; and (5) the Procura-
tor as the instrument of socialist legal systems. The latter half of the pa-
per, concerning the ability of the executive to remedy fundamental rights
violations, is examined from the institutional model of the Ombudsman.
* Hector Fix Zamudio is Director of the Institute of Legal Research and Professor of
Law at the Universidad Nacional Autonomia de Mexico in Mexico City. The initial editing
was done by Professor James A.R. Nafziger of the Willamette University College of Law,
and the translation was done by Linda Friedman Ramirez, a member of the Oregon Bar and
recent graduate of the Willamette University College of Law.
An Addendum is appended at the end of the article to note briefly the most recent
developments in the myriad of laws mentioned in this survey.
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I. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
A. Conceptualization and Classification of Domestic Remedies
1. The Necessity of Exhausting Domestic Judicial Remedies
Before Recourse to the International System
The availability of international authorities and commissions such as
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the European Commission
and European Court of Human Rights to redress human rights violations
is expanding. An essential pre-requisite for recourse to the international
petition system is prior exhaustion of domestic remedies.' Therefore, a
study of the means by which human rights can be protected through the
domestic legal process is of great importance.
2. Classification of Legal Remedies
a. Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Fundamental Rights
The first category refers to legal remedies that are directed to the
protection of statutory rights, but which can be utilized indirectly for the
protection of fundamental rights. Administrative justice and judicial ac-
tions, including civil and criminal actions, fall within this category.
Though indirect, both legal forums can be used as direct means to pro-
tect basic human rights; for example, a judicial proceeding may assure the
protection of fundamental rights such as due process, access to the court
for redress of grievances, and the right to a fair trial. France provides an
administrative remedy to protect the human rights of citizens through its
Council of State.'
1. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United
Nations states in article 2 as one condition for a complaint's admissability, "that the indi-
vidual has exhausted all available domestic remedies." Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967). The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
states in article 26 that "the Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international
law." European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4,
1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5. The American Convention on
Human Rights states in article 46, section 1(a) that a petition will be admitted to the Com-
mission only if "the requirements under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law." American Convention
on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36
at 1.
2. The Council of State has jurisdiction over the activity of the executive branch in
France, although it is an administrative tribunal within that branch and thus independent
of it. Individuals can petition the Council to redress grievances caused by government ac-
tions and may be awarded damages or other remedies. For a complete description of the
French judiciary, see R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY
(M. Kindred trans. 1972).
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b. Complementary Remedies
Complementary remedies are not created for the protection of the
rights of man, but are used to compensate for the irreparable violations of
fundamental rights when such violations have been committed. In this
sense, they are equivalent to remedies that have been classified by one
school of thought as restrictive. Two examples of complementary reme-
dies are: (1) a judgment of a political nature about the accountability of
high public officials when they have compromised the Constitution, and
particularly the human rights guaranteed by it; and (2) the economic re-
sponsibility of the state when its activity has caused damage which has
had a prejudicial effect on fundamental rights.
c. Specific Remedies
Specific legal remedies are those that have gradually been shaped
with the purpose of granting rapid and effective protection to fundamen-
tal rights, in an immediate and direct manner, generally with remedial
effect. These instruments can be grouped, according to the approach of
the Italian jurist Mauro Cappelletti, as "constitutional jurisdiction over
liberty."'
In this category, we mention habeas corpus and judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws and offical acts from the Anglo-American system;
the acci6n, recurso or juicio de amparo and the mandado de seguranqa
in the Latin American legal system; and the Verfassungsbeschwerde
(constitutional appeal) of some continental European countries. Other
protective mechanisms that cannot be considered strictly as part of the
legal process, but which can be used specifically as legal instruments for
the protection of human rights in various other countries include the




Habeas corpus apparently had its origin in Roman law, but gradually
developed into British custom in the Middle Ages. It began as a judicial
order for the appearance of persons before the court, and during the 14th
and 15th centuries, in such laws as the proceso foral aragon~s de
manifestacion de las personas (Aragonese statute to produce the person),
it assumed the fundamental purpose of examining the legality of the de-
tention of persons.4 Whereas the Aragonese statute was abolished in 1591,
3. For an exposition of Cappelletti's views on the historical development of "constitu-
tionalization," see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
See also M. CAPPELLETTI, LA JURISDICcI6N CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA LIBERTAD (H. Fix Zamudio
trans. 1961).
4. See LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1679, 31 CAR. I. CH. 2, as amended by 56 Geo.III ch.
1983
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on the occasion of the famous episode of Antonio Perez,5 in England
habeas corpus developed in an uninterrupted manner until it culminated
in the Law of Habeas Corpus of 1679.6
a. The Doctrine of Habeas Corpus in the United States
In the United States, the writ of habeas corpus was applied in colo-
nial times by virtue of the above-mentioned Law of 1679. Subsequently it
became incorporated into some of the constitutions drawn up after the
War of Independence, such as the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, and the Federal Constitution of
1787.7
In federal law the writ of habeas corpus has had a very important
evolution. The U.S. Supreme Court initially limited its scope to con-
testing acts of administrative authorities and, only in exceptional cases, to
incompetent judicial decisions. Gradually, the possibility of challenging
judicial decisions was recognized, especially when they were based on
statutory provisions that were considered unconstitutional. Habeas
corpus is now openly recognized as the means by which to appeal final
decisions of local courts, based upon errors which have been committed
that affect the constitutional rights of the accused.
In this regard, two opinions of the Warren Court are of particular
note: Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)1 and Miranda v. Arizona (1966)," both of
which strengthened the exercise of the fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination, as well as the right to counsel even during
custodial investigation by the police.
Since 1969, the year in which Warren Burger became Chief Justice,
the rights of accused persons have undergone significant changes. Specifi-
cally, the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted the scope of federal habeas
corpus relief because of the growing number of petitions that have been
brought before the federal courts challenging local decisions. However,
these changes have not undermined the essential function of habeas
corpus.
100 (1893); W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus §§ 23 (2nd ed. 1893). See
also V. FAIREN GUILL9N, ANTECEDENTES AROGONESES DE LOS JUICIOS DE AMPARO (1971) (a
study of the history of the evolution of amparo).
5. Antonio Perez was an extremely capable statesman and favorite in the Spanish court
of Philip II, who was imprisoned for a murder in which the king allegedly had complicity.
For a full treatment, see G. MARARON, ANTONIO PEREZ: "SPANISH TRAITOR" (C.D. Ley trans.
1954).
6. Law of Habeas Corpus, 1679, note 4 supra.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 7; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
91.
8. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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b. The Doctrine of Habeas Corpus in England
In England, habeas corpus traditionally conformed to the law of 1679
and was utilized to defend individuals against detentions ordered by the
administrative authorities subordinate to the Crown. It evolved to be-
come the means by which the deprivation of liberty brought about by
judicial order could be challenged. Because of its widespread application,
with repeated and successful appeals before various judges, the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act of 1960 '0 now limits its use. The 1960 Act permits
prison wardens, against whom habeas corpus petitions are directed, the
possibility of appeal against the granting of habeas corpus protection.
This is possible even when the appeal has a delaying effect prejudicial to
the accused.
2. Judicial Review
The concept of judical review that now exists in numerous countries
of the world has its origin in the British Colonies. The control that the
Private Council of the Crown exercised over decisions of the colonial
courts was of particular influence in America. For example, the theory of
the English Judge Edward Coke contained in the classic Bonham's Case"
stated that there exists a superior right which cannot be contradicted by
the Laws of Parliament. Paradoxically, at that time the courts of England
did not have the power to pass judgment on the constitutionality of laws,
due to the principle of parliamentary supremacy.
The concept of judicial review was incorporated into the U.S. Consti-
tution and was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, most notably in the
case of Marbury v. Madison." The case established that all legal deci-
sions are subject to the principles of the Constitution, and in cases where
Constitutional principles conflict, an individual may bring the question
before local courts whose decisions are subject to appeal in the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
The principle of judicial review was introduced by almost all Latin
American constitutions, as well as by the majority of countries that pres-
ently comprise the Commonwealth of Nations, with the exceptions of
England, New Zealand, Israel and South Africa. The principle of judicial
review has had an influence in various continental European countries,
particularly Switzerland, and to some extent in Norway and Denmark. 3
10. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, § 15.
11. 8 Co. Crep. 114a; 77 E.R. 646 (K.B. 1610).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. In addition, judicial review has influenced the legal systems of Rumania and the
Weimar Republic in the first post-war period, as well as in the Italian Republic under its
Constitution of 1948 and until the Constitutional Court began to function in 1956.
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3. Extraordinary Writs
The writs of injunction and mandamus, in addition to those of quo
warranto, prohibition and certiorari, were established in traditional En-
glish law as a means of collateral challenge. 4 They have on occasion been
utilized by individuals for the defense of specifically guaranteed rights
under the law or by the Constitution, without losing their quality of being
standard proceedings.
These methods of challenge have been transformed in some legal sys-
tems into specific instruments for the defense of fundamental rights. 5 In
this same manner, some Argentinian provincial constitutions, such as
those of Santiago del Estero (1939), Chaco, Chubut, Rio Negro and For-
mosa-all written in 1957-have adopted the writs of injunction and
mandamus with the names of mandamientos de prohibici6n y ejecuci6n,
which can be issued by the courts at the request of those affected to re-
strict state authorities from fulfillment of an obligation established under
law.' 6
C. THE SPECIAL SYSTEM IN LATIN AMERICA
The acci6n, recurso or juicio de amparo (injunction) is undoubtedly
the prime instrument for the protection of human rights that has gained
wide acceptance throughout Latin America. It was initially consecrated in
the state constitution of Yucatan (Mexico) of 1841,17 due to the ideas of
Manuel Crescencio Rej6n. It was then introduced into the federal sphere
in Mexico by Mariano Otero under the "Acta de Reformas" of 1847'8 and
culminated in articles 101 and 102 of the Federal Constitution of Febru-
ary 5, 1857."9
The Republic of El Salvador, in its Constitution of August 13, 1886,'0
was the first country to introduce the amparo subsequent to Mexico.
Later, Honduras and Nicaragua introduced the amparo into their Consti-
14. In England, the writs were transformed into prerogative orders beginning in 1938.
15. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF INDIA arts. 32 & 246; and CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF
UNION OF BURMA art. 25.
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CHACO art. 22 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE THE
PROVNcE oF Cmuuu'r aris. 35-36 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF FORMOSA For-
mosa art. 32 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF RIO NEGRO arts. 12-13 (Argen.);
CONSTITU 12-13 (ARGEN.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO art. 22
(Argen.).
17. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE FREE STATE OF YUCATAN, SANCTIONED BY ITS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONGESS ON MARCH 31, 1981. For the Mexican evolution of amparo, see H. CLAG-
ETT & D. VALDERRAMA, A REVISED GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF MEXICO
3861 (1973).
18. Constitutional Act of Reforms Sanctioned by the Extraordinary Constitutional
Congress of the Mexican United States on May 18, 1847.
19. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES SANCTIONED AND SWORN BY
THE GENERAL CONSTITUTIVE CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 5, 1857 arts. 101-102.
20. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR of 1886 art. 110.
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tutions and Laws of Amparo, in 1894 and 1897, respectively.21
At the present time, there are thirteen Latin American countries with
constitutional enactments that guarantee the right of amparo: Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador and Venezuela, in addition to the
Brazilian writ of security (mandado de seguranqa), translated by some
authors as a mandamiento de amparo because of its similarity to the
amparo.
In order to compare the protective capacity of the right of amparo, it
is necessary to classify this very complex material as follows:
1. One type of amparo is intended solely as an instrument equivalent
to the habeas corpus and can be utilized only for the protection of indi-
vidual freedom against illegal detention or with respect to irregularities in
criminal proceedings.
2
Some of the Argentine codes of criminal procedure refer indiscrimi-
nately to the writ of habeas corpus or to the amparo of personal liberty,
and a similar provision appears in the Fifth Transitory Provision of the
Venezuelan Constitution of 1961.
2. By way of contrast, in the laws of Argentina, Venezuela, and re-
cently Peru, the recurso or acci6n de amparo has acquired significance as
an instrument for the protection of fundamental constitutional rights
other than personal liberty. Personal liberty, which is protected through
the traditional writ of habeas corpus, constituting the first type of
amparo, is an exception to the more general meaning and use of the sec-
ond type of amparo.
2
3
21. Guatemala introduced the amparo in the constitutional reform of March 11, 1921,
and in Argentina it was introduced in the Constitution of the Province of Sante Fe, on
August 13, 1921. Panama introduced it in its Constitution of January 2, 1941; Costa Rica in
its Supreme Law of 1949; Venezuela in its Constitution of 1961; Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ec-
uador in their constitutions all promulgated the amparo in 1967 (although Ecuador has
since abolished it), and finally Peru included it in its Constitution executed in July of 1979,
which became effective July, 1980.
Also, the amparo was enacted in the two federal constitutions of Central America: the
Political Constitution of the United States of Central America (Honduras, Nicaragua and El
Salvador), promulgated in 1898; and the Charter of the Central American Republic (Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Honduras), of September 9, 1921.
It is appropriate to point out that the right of amparo has been reestablished in the
Spanish Constitution that became effective on December 29, 1978. It was introduced previ-
ously in the Republican Charter, December 9, 1931, due to the teachings of the Mexican
jurist, Rodolfo Reyes.
22. The amparo has been given this meaning in the Republic of Chile. The Political
Constitution of the Republic of Chile of 1925 (at least prior to the military coups of 1973)
provides for a habeas corpus type writ in its amparo.
23. The following countries' laws have also included amparo procedures for the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Paraguay and the Republic of Panama.
Bolivia:
The Constitution of Bolivia art. 19, promulgated Feb. 2, 1967, introduced the recurso
1983
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a. Argentina
The right of amparo in the Republic of Argentina has been the ob-
ject of an expansion that we can characterize as explosive, even though it
was introduced long ago in article 17 of the Constitution of the Province
of Santa Fe of 1921. With regard to this Argentine instrument, we ought
to distinguish two sectors: the provincial sphere, where the regulation of
the legal process at the provincial level is in conformity with national re-
quirements, and the national sphere, where the right of amparo has been
somewhat limited.
I. At the provincial level, the recurso o acci6n de amparo created in
article 17 of the Constitution of Sante Fe in 1921 was first regulated by
Law Number 2994 of October 1, 1935. Subsequently, it was created in
article 22 of the Constitution of Santiago de Estero of June 2, 1939, regu-
lated by articles 673 to 655 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the same
de amparo, as independent from habeas corpus, against the illegal acts or wrongful omis-
sions of public officials or individuals that restrict, suppress, or threaten to restrict or sup-
press the rights and guarantees recognized by the Constitution. This instrument has been
regulated by arts. 762-767 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Bolivia.
Costa Rica:
The Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica art. 48(3) (1949) regulates the recurso
de amparo to maintain or re-establish the rights guaranteed by this same Constitution, with
the exception of personal liberty protected by habeas corpus. This provision is regulated by
Law No. 1161 of June 2, 1980.
Ecuador:
The former Constitution of Ecuador, promulgated May 25, 1967, established the
amparo jurisdiccional in art. 28, cl. 15, as protection against "any violation of constitutional
guarantees." However, the amparo jurisdiccional has never been applied by virtue of the
lack of a regulatory law, and also by the successive coup d'6tats of 1971 and 1972, which
brought back the Constitutions of 1946 and 1945, respectively, both of which did not recog-
nize the amparo. The current Constitution approved in the referendum of January 15, 1978
also does not contain the right of amparo.
El Salvador:
Art. 89, pt. I of the current Constitution of El Salvador of Jan. 8, 1962 (regulated by
art. 12 et seq of the Law of Constitutional Procedures of Jan. 14, 1960) regulates the process
of amparo for the protection of constitutionally guaranteed human rights in a manner inde-
pendent of the writ of habeas corpus, which is limited to the protection of personal liberty.
Guatemala:
The Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala art. 80 (1965) and the first part of pt. I
of the Law of Amparn; Habeas Corpus, and Constitutionality of April 20, 1966, establish
that the fundamental purpose of amparo consists in maintaining or restoring the enjoyment
of rights and guarantees provided by the Constitution with the exception of personal liberty.
Paraguay:
The Constitution of Paraguay art. 77 (1967) provides for the right of amparo in a form
similar to the Constitution of Bolivia. Although a regulatory law has not been passed, some
case law has directly supported the constitutional provision.
Republic of Panama:
The Constitution of the Republic of Panama art. 49 regulates the recurso de amparo
of constitutional guarantees in a form independent from the writ of habeas corpus against
the acts of authority that violate constitutional rights and guarantees. This precept is regu-
lated by the Enabling Law of Constitutional Remedies and Guarantees (Law No. 46 of No-
vember 24, 1956).
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province, issued in 1944 (and preserved in articles 818 to 829 of the new
Civil and Commerical Procedural Code of November 14, 1969). After
that, it appeared in article 33 of the Constitution of the Province of Men-
doza, of May 31, 1949.
After the 1955 military overthrow of the first government of General
Per6n, the recurso or accion de amparo received a new impetus so that it
was incorporated into the following provincial constitutions: Catamarca
(1966); Corrientes (1960); Chubut (1957); Formosa (1957); Misiones
(1958); La Pampa (1960); Rio Negro (1957); Santa Cruz (1957); and Santa
Fe (1962).24
In addition to the above-mentioned local constitutional enactments,
a number of regulatory laws were passed and, without intending to be
exhaustive, we mention the following, all of them called the Law of Ac-
cion de Amparo: Buenos Aires (1965-66); Catamarca (1977); Cordoba
(1967-74); Corrientes (1970); Entre Rios (1947-63); La Rioja (1960); Men-
doza (1954-75); Misiones (1962-67); Salta (1977); San Luis (1958); Santa
Cruz (1958-77/78); and Santa Fe (1935-69/73).
Thus, without even considering other local legislation which included
the amparo (such as the Civil and Penal Codes of Santiago del Estero
mentioned previously), we can affirm that practically all the provinces of
Argentina have created the right of amparo in their constitutions, specific
regulatory laws, or in their procedural codes.
II. Nationally, the accibn de amparo first appeared in the Supreme
Court of Justice through the cases of Angel Siri (December 27, 1957) and
Samuel Kot (September 5, 1958).26 It has been expanded considerably by
virtue of the decisions of the federal courts that have admitted the right
of amparo, not only in opposition to the acts of the authorities, but also
with respect to some social pressure groups. The National Law on the
acci6n de amparo" was subsequently passed, restricting the scope of this
procedural instrument in various aspects and limiting it with respect to
pressure groups. As a substitution, the so-called summary process, or
amparo against the acts of individuals, was established.
27
24. CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CATAMARCA arts. 38-39 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF
THE PROVINCE OF CORRIENTES art. 145(13) (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF CHU-
BUT art. 34 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF FORMOSA art. 20 (Argen.); CONSTITU-
TION OF THE PROVINCE OF MISIONES arts. 16-18 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF
PAMPA art. 16 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF RIO NEGRO art. 11 (Argen.); CON-
STITUTION OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CRUZ art. 15 (Argen.); CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE
OF SANTA FE art. 17 (Argen.).
25. Much of the opinions in Siri and Kot have been translated into English in both K.
KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 652-58
(1966) and K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK
161-65 (1975).
26. No. 16,986, Oct. 18, 1966.
27. CODE OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURES, art. 321 (Law No. 17,454 of Sept. 20,
1967).
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b. Venezuela
The Venezuelan Constitution of January 26, 1961 enacted the
amparo in its article 49. The amparo serves as an instrument for the pro-
tection of all fundamental constitutional rights, with the exception of per-
sonal liberty, which is protected by the rules of the Fifth Transitory Pro-
vision of the same constitution.28 Article 49 has not been applied,
however, because of the lack of a corresponding regulatory law. Although
some judicial decisions began introducing this legal instrument into case
law, this practice was curtailed with the resolutions of the Sala Politico
Administrativo (Political Administrative Division) of the Supreme Court,




The right of amparo was not introduced until very recently in Peru,
in the new Constitution approved in July, 1979.30 Only after a long evolu-
tion beginning with article 69 of the previous Constitution of 1933,31 in
which the amparo was confused with the writ of habeas corpus, did the
new Constitution extend to protect all constitutionally guaranteed funda-
mental rights. The current Constitution, executed by the Constitutional
Assembly, July 13, 1979 and which became effective in July, 1980, initi-
ated the new constitutional government that replaced the military regime
and provided for the amparo in article 295.
This provision clearly distinguishes the amparo from the writ of
habeas corpus, so that the writ of habeas corpus is limited to its tradi-
tional role of protecting personal liberty, while the purpose of the amparo
is "to be on guard for those other rights recognized by the Constitution,
that are vulnerable or are threatened by an authority, official or
person." 2
3. There exists a third group of laws that gives the amparo a
broader application than even the second group while retaining more pre-
cisely the direct influence of the Mexican amparo; for example, article 58
of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras of June 3, 1965, regu-
lated by the Law of Amparo of April 14, 1936; and the Nicaraguan Con-
stitution of 1973, with its Law of Amparo of October 23, 1974. In these
enactrment-; the amparo has assumed three purposes: (1) its own special
protection of fundamental rights; (2) the protection of personal liberty for
the purpose of habeas corpus; and (3) the very limited protection against
28. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUALA art. 5 (transitory) (1961).
29. Agreement with Obligatory Force, Apr. 24, 1972. See H. Fix ZAMUDIO, LA PROTEC-
C1ON PROCESAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES (1982).
30. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU art. 295, July 13, 1979, effective July, 1980.
31. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU SANCTIONED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS OF
1931, promulgated Apr. 9, 1933.
32. See note 30 supra.
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statutory provisions that violate the Constitution. Accordingly, a protec-
tive judgment invalidates the challenged provision, but only with regard
to the petitioner.
Because of the popular revolution that overthrew the prolonged dic-
tatorship of the Somoza family in 1979, the Nicaraguan Constitution of
1973 was replaced by the Fundamental Statute, promulgated by the Gov-
ernment of National Reconstruction on July 20, 1979. This same govern-
ment issued the Law of August 31, 1979 on the rights and guarantees of
Nicaraguans, in which article 50 guarantees the recurso de amparo for
the protection of the rights or liberties recognized by both statutes.
Based upon article 50, two statutes were enacted: the first, enacted Janu-
ary 8, 1980, exclusively protects the personal liberty of habeas corpus,8
and the second, enacted May 28, 1980, protects other human rights.84
4. The Mexican amparo3 5 possesses a protective sphere much wider
than any of the other previously mentioned institutions by the same
name. It serves five functions: (1) as an instrument to protect personal
liberty, similar to the writ of habeas corpus; (2) as the only means by
which to challenge the constitutionality of laws, thus receiving the name
amparo contra leyes; (3) as a means to challenge judicial decisions in all
courts of the country, local as well as federal, thus having been called
"amparo judicial or casaci6n" (repeal) because of its similarity to the
recurso de casaci6n; (4) as an appellate instrument to challenge the deci-
sions or acts of administrative authorities that cannot otherwise be chal-
lenged in an administrative court, thus functioning as a "proceso con-
tencioso administrativo" (adversarial administrative proceeding); and (5)
at the beginning of the reforms to the legislation of amparo in February
1963, special formalities were introduced to protect legally the campesi-
nos subject to the agrarian reform, such as the ejidatarios and
comuneros. This has received the doctrinal name of amparo social
agrario (social agrarian amparo).
The significance of the Mexican amparo can be distinguished from
other Latin American legal systems which attribute these five functions
to different procedural instruments. The Mexican amparo protects not
only constitutional rights, but also rights established by legislation in a
manner that constitutes an instrument to protect all laws-from the con-
stitution to the most humble municipal ordinance.
33. Law of Amparo for Liberty and Personal Security, Jan. 8, 1980. This law specifi-
cally protects rights guaranteed under habeas corpus.
34. Law of Amparo, May 28, 1980. The fundamental rights other than those under
habeas corpus are protected by this law.
35. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES arts. 103 & 107 (1917);
New Law of Amparo Pursuant to Articles 103 & 107 of the Federal Constitution, D.O., Jan.
10, 1936 (amended 1951, 1968 & 1976). For an English translation of the 1917 Constitution,
see THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917 COMPARED wrr THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857 (H.
Branch trans. & arranger, 1917).
36. Fix ZAMUDIO, BREvE INTRODUCCI6N AL JUCIO DE AMPARO MEXICANO 152-67 (1977).
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5. Upon examination of the European constitutional appeal, we will
make a brief reference to that which is referred to as the recurso de
amparo, established in the new Spanish Constitution of December 29,
1978.37
6. The mandado de seguranqa, which has been previously men-
tioned and which has been characterized by some writers as the
mandamiento de amparo, was introduced by the Brazilian Federal Con-
stitution of 1934."s The mandado de seguranQa proceeds specifically
against unconstitutional or illegal acts of administrative authorities and,
in general, against administrative acts of any authority that affect the
rights of the governed. In exceptional cases it also governs judicial deci-
sions. Theoretically, the writ cannot be brought against legislative enact-
ments that are considered to be unconstitutional, but can only be used to
challenge administrative acts or decisions that are based on unconstitu-
tional laws.
7. Finally, a mechanism peculiar to Latin American law should be
mentioned. It is the acci6n popular de inconstitucionalidad (popular act
of unconstitutionality), by which every citizen has standing to go before
his respective Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of a law.
If this claim is considered well-founded, the high court will declare the
law unconstitutional with general effects (erga omnes). The Organic Law
of the Supreme Court of Justice of July 30, 1976 and article 188, part I of
the Constitution of the Republic of Panama of 1972, and the Law on
Constitutional Appeals and Guarantees of October 24, 1956 as well as ar-
ticle 96 of the Constitution of El Salvador of 1962, all require a general
interest on the part of the claimant. This mechanism was provided for, at
least in theory, in articles 150 to 173 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Cuba of 1940, which was amended in 1959. Beginning in July 1973,
various reforms were established in the Cuban judicial system in accor-
dance with the Soviet model, all of which were reaffirmed in the Constitu-
tion of 1976.1' Provision was expressly made for the type of constitutional
control that predominates in the socialist legal systems and which will be
examined later in this survey.
D. The System of Continental Europe
1. French Constitutional Analysis
French constitutional analysis must be understood within the frame-
work of its traditional opposition to judicial review of the constitutional-
ity of the acts of authority. In the absence of a specific mechanism for the
37. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION art. 53, Dec. 29, 1978.
38. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL art. 113, para. 33
(1934, as amended by art. 153, para. 21, Jan. 24, 1967).
39. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, arts. 121-33, Feb. 24, 1976. The details of
the administration of the Cuban judiciary and its present form are found in the Law of
Organization of the Judicial System, June, 1973.
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protection of fundamental rights by courts of first impression, this protec-
tion has been entrusted in an indirect manner to two specialized organs:
the Council of State and the Constitutional Council, a political body.
a. French Council of State
The French Council of State, as an organ of administrative justice,
has acquired great prestige due to the notable work achieved by its court
decisions favoring the protection of civil liberties and the protection of
constitutionally guaranteed human rights. This Council takes its modern
form, by virtue of laws 6 and 7-11 of October 1790,40 issued by the Revo-
lutionary French Assembly, which placed it within the administration's
control, but from which it later gradually acquired its independence.
The law of May 24, 187241 should be noted as truly important in the
evolution of this institution. It transformed the judicial function of the
Council into a court of delegated jurisdiction with a certain degree of au-
tonomy in making decisions. The Law of September 30, 195342 further
reorganized the administrative justice system, establishing inferior ad-
ministrative courts of original jurisdiction in such a manner that, at pre-
sent, the Council of State operates, except for special cases, as a court of
appeals.
Three types of claims can be asserted before the Council of State: (1)
quo warranto (excess or abuse of power), which involves the nullification
of an administrative determination made by an incompetent authority
when procedural formalities have not been followed, or because of its fun-
damental illegality; (2) abuse of discretion (the most important jurispru-
dentially), which involves the examination of administrative acts and de-
cisions made in the exercise of discretional authority; and (3) general
administrative jurisdiction, which examines public services contracts and
the responsibility of public officials and the administration to the public
for such contracts.
Although the methods of challenge are not structured as specific rem-
edies for the procedural protection of fundamental rights, according to
some the Council of State has indirectly been converted into a "constitu-
tional judge." The Council looks to the preamble of the Constitution of
1958 as a source of fundamental "general principles of law." The Council
then applies them to controversies within its jurisdiction, and by these
principles has given the force of law to the Declaration of Rights of
1789,"1 completed by the Charter of 1946.""
40. See Letourner, El Consejo de Estado Franc~s, REvISTA DE LA COMISI6N INTERNA-
cIONAL DE JURISTAS, Dec., 1967, at 96-100.
41. Under the law of May 24, 1872, "executory force was given to the judgments of the
Conseil d'Etat." See C. HAMSON, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL 82 (1954).
42. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 151.
43. Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Aug. 26, 1789. For an English
translation of the Declaration, see J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 543-45 (J.
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b. Constitutional Council
The current Constitution of 1958"5 provided for the Constitutional
Council, with antecedents in the Constitutional Committee of the 1946
Charter.4 In accordance with articles 56 to 63, the Constitutional Council
must decide on the constitutionality of organic laws and rules of the As-
sembly before they are promulgated. At the request of either the Presi-
dent of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or a President of any of the two
legislative houses (the National Assembly or the Senate), any other law
can be submitted to the review of the Council. As a result, if the Council
decides that a law or rule is unconstitutional, it cannot be promulgated.
This Council played a very modest role in the constitutional control
of laws until 1971, when the Council came forth with a classic resolution
on the protection of freedom of association. The number of members of
the Council who were legal scholars increased and in 1974 amendments to
article 61 of the Constitution and article 18 of the Organic Law of the
Constitutional Council of November 7, 1958 created a new complaint
(saisine) by which members of parliament could raise the issue of consti-
tutionality of a law as a preventive measure. 7
This reform has stimulated a transformation of the activities of the
Constitutional Council. It has been converted into an effective organ for
the protection of fundamental rights by way of its prior review of numer-
ous legislative enactments. This is essentially due to the high number of
petitions from parliamentary groups. Doctrinally, the Council has come to
be considered as having truly constitutional jurisdiction."
2. Continental Constitutional Courts
Constitutional courts have been established in accordance with the
model initiated by the Austrian Constitution of 1920-29, with the support
of ideas from the well-known Hans Kelsen on the necessity of establish-
ing a true, specialized constitutional jurisdiction." It has become known
as the "Austrian" system of constitutional control, which is to be distin-
guished from the "American" system of constitutional control.
In very broad terms, it can be stated that there are two ways in
Garner trans. 1915).
44. Letourner, supra note 40, at 114-15.
45. CONSTrrUTION OF FRANCE arts. 56-63 (1958).
46. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF OCTOBER 13, 1946, arts. 19 et seq.
47. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 164.
48. Favoreu, 1977, Annke Charnire: le Dtveloppment de la saisine parlamentaire et
de la jurisprudence relative aux liberts et droits fondamentaux, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L' TRANGER, May-June 1978.
49. The AUSTRIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION of 1920-29 was re-established in 1945 and is
regulated by the Law on the Constitutional Court of 1953 in accordance with the Constitu-
tional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). See H. Kelsen, La guarantia jurisdiccional de la
Constituti6n, I [1974] ANUARIO JURiDICO 471.
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which constitutional courts can protect fundamental rights: first, through
the control of the constitutionality of law, that is to say, annulment with
effects erga omnes of legislation that is considered contrary to the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the constitution; and second, by challenging
the constitutionality of acts by any authority, especially those of an ad-
ministrative nature that affect fundamental rights. Such legal challenges
can be made through such mechanisms as the constitutional appeal under
German law,50 and recently by means of the recurso de amparo provided
for by the Spanish Constitution of 1978.51
a. Articles 139 and 140 of the Austrian Federal Constitution of
1920-29 provide for review of the constitutionality of legislation, local or
federal, on petitions from the federal government or governments of the
federated states, respectively. Where some doubt exists as to the constitu-
tionality of a law applicable in an actual case, jurisdiction has been given
to the Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Affairs (Oberster Gericht-
shof), and to the Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht-
shof) to suspend the proceedings and request that the fundamental rights
issue be resolved by the Constitutional Court.
b. The most elaborate system of this type is that established by ar-
ticles 93 and 94 of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Ger-
many,51 which was inspired by the Austrian system and which provides
for a Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
This Federal Constitutional Court recognizes claims made by federal
or state governments, challenging the constitutionality of state and fed-
eral laws respectively (abstrakte Normenkontrolle). In addition, it acts to
review issues raised by the courts when doubt exists as to the constitu-
tionality of laws applicable in cases being heard (Richterklage).
It ought to be noted that in the majority of West German states with
courts functioning at the local level and in the same manner as this Fed-
eral Court, there are various constitutional courts which carry out the
same functions, but which do not inhibit questions relating to the Federal
Constitution from reaching the Federal Constitutional Court."
c. The Constitution of the Italian Republic, which became effective
January 1, 1948, provided in articles 134 to 137 for a Constitutional
Court, which, for political reasons, could not function until 1956." In ac-
50. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Grundgesetz, cited GG), art.
93, § 4a, May 23, 1949 (as amended by the Federal Law of Jan. 29, 1969).
51. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION, Title IX, arts. 159-65, Dec. 29, 1978.
52. The BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Grundgesetz, cited GG),
May 23, 1949, inspired by the Austrian system, provides for a Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), and is regulated by its Organic Law of March 12, 1951 (as
amended).
53. H. Fix Zarnudio, supra note 29, at 180.
54. "Largely because of the difficulty of selecting judges in a turbulent political climate,
the Court was not instituted until 1956." M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE
ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 77 (1967).
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cordance with the Austrian model, this constitutional court takes jurisdic-
tion of claims made directly by the national government or by autono-
mous regions regarding adherence to the Constitution of local or national
laws. It differs from the Austrian model because the issue of constitu-
tionality can be brought by the courts. When the question of constitu-
tionality arises in an actual case, before a judge of a lower court can con-
sider the issue to be justiciable, he must suspend the proceedings until
the issue is resolved by the appropriate constitutional court.55
d. Title IX, articles 159 to 165 of the Spanish Constitution, which
became effective December 29, 1978, provides for the structure and juris-
diction of the Constitutional Court, which very closely follows the exam-
ples of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court's or-
ganic law was promulgated October 3, 1979.26 The above provisions
establish the constitutional appeal as the means by which the following
people or bodies can bring a claim of the unconstitutionality of national
laws, provisions having the force of law and provisions of the Autonomous
Committees before the Constitutional Court: the president of the govern-
ment, the public defender (Ombudsman), fifty deputies, fifty senators, or
the executive bodies of the Autonomous Communities. As in Italy, under
article 163, judges in Spain also have access to this court if the issue is
raised in an actual case.
57
e. A similar although unique system has been created by the Con-
stitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 25, 1976. Articles 280 to 282
regulate the jurisdiction and function of an organ of constitutional control
called the Council of the Revolution. The Council, which is predomi-
nantly comprised of the military, is competent to declare laws unconstitu-
tional at the request of the President of the Republic, the President of
the Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Promoter of Justice
(Ombudsman), the Attorney General of the Republic or the Assembly of
Autonomous Regions. The Council of the Revolution is also competent to
declare a legislative rule unconstitutional with general, binding effect
when the Constitutional Commission, its administrative body, finds it to
be contrary to the Constitution as applied in three actual cases, or in only
one case, if it is found prima facie unconstitutional."
f. A Supreme Constitutional Court was introduced in articles 133 to
151 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, promulgated August
55. "The competence of, and procedures before, the Court, as well as the necessary
suspension of civil proceedings, are governed by the Constitution [arts. 127 & 13437], consti-
tutional laws [Constitutional Laws of Feb. 9, 1948, no. 1 and Mar. 11, 1953, no. 87] and
ordinary legislation [Law of Mar. 11, 1953, no. 87 and Law of Mar. 18, 1958, no. 265]." Id. at
117.
56. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, Oct. 3, 1979.
57. "When a court of law considers a legal norm determinative of a case, but of doubt-
ful constitutional validity, it will submit the matter to the Constitutional Court in such
cases ...." G. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution, Comments and Full Text, 7 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 127 (1980).
58. CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC arts. 277-78 & 280-82, Apr. 25, 1976.
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16, 1960. The Court had extremely disparate and complicated powers, but
had the fundamental purpose of achieving an equilibrium between the
Greek and Turkish communities in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution. This Court and the Court of Appeals were abolished in
June 1964 in favor of a Supreme Court that combines the functions of
both.5 '
g. In articles 145 to 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tur-
key, promulgated July 9, 1961, a constitutional court was established and
expressly modeled after those of Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany.60
h. A Constitutional Court was created by the Greek Constitution of
1968." Drafted according to the Austrian model and with some influence
from the German system, it existed, however, only theoretically by virtue
of the authoritarian Government of the Colonels. The Constitution of
June 9, 1975 abolished this court. Article 100 of the 1975 Constitution
created a special court with jurisdiction over questions of the funda-
mental constitutionality or constitutional interpretations of laws when
contradictory decisions have been made by the Council of State, the
Court of Appeal, or the Exchequer.
i. In some socialist countries, the door has been opened to the influ-
ence of the Austrian system. It was effectively introduced into the Consti-
tution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 which aban-
doned the Soviet system of constitutional control in order to follow the
example of the Federal Republic of Germany. In articles 241 and 251 of
the Constitution of April 7, 1963, as well as in the constitutions of all six
republics that comprise the Federative People's Republic (promulgated
the same year), the federal constitutional court and local constitutional
courts, respectively, were established. In the two Federated Republics
that comprise the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, a Federal Constitu-
tional Court, as well as local constitutional courts, exist by virtue of the
Constitutional Amendment of October 27, 1968,s" lacking only the neces-
sary regulatory laws.
3. Austrian Influence On Latin American Constitutional Courts
With regard to Latin America, there have been various laws which
59. Administration of Justice Law, Miscellaneous Provisions, July 9, 1964.
60. The Law on a Constituent Assembly was promulgated on June 29, 1981, forming a
Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution on political parties and an electoral law. It is
not known whether the new constitution will provide for a constitutional court.
61. CONSTITUTION OF G EECE arts. 95 et seq, Sept. 29, 1968.
62. These Republics are the People's Republic of Serbia, the People's Republic of Croa-
tia, the People's Republic of Slovenia, the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
People's Republic of Macedonia and the People's Republic of Montenegro.
63. Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 of Oct. 27 set up the Czechoslovak Socialist Re-
public as a federative state of two equal fraternal nations: the Czech Socialist Republic and
the Slovak Socialist Republic.
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have introduced specialized constitutional courts according to the Aus-
trian model.
a. The Court of Constitutionality established in the Guatemalan
Constitution 4 is regulated by articles 105 to 111 of the Law of Amparo,
Habeas Corpus and Constitutionality of April 20, 1966.
b. The Constitutional Court of Chile 5 functioned actively from
1971 until 1973, when it was abolished by the military junta that came to
power in September of that year.
c. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees established by the Ecua-
dorean Constitution of January 15, 1978 does not have decisional powers
equal to those of the National House of Representatives. However, when
the House is not in session, the Court can formulate observations on the
conformity of legislation to the Constitution."6
d. The Peruvian Constitution of 1979 established a Court of Consti-
tutional Guarantees similar to the Austrian model, wherein it empowered
the court to declare, with general effect, the total or partial constitution-
ality of legislation. The court can be petitioned by the following: the Pres-
ident of the Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Attorney Gen-
eral, sixty deputies, twenty senators, or 50,000 citizens with signatures
verified by the National Panel of Elections.
7
e. Finally, the evolution of Colombian constitutional law, referred
to previously as the acci6n popular de inconstitucionalidad, is high-
lighted in the amendments to the Constitution of 1968. A constitutional
division was established at the headquarters of the Supreme Court of
Justice to advise and formulate opinions as to the constitutionality of
laws before such questions would be decided by the full court." Through
the recent reforms of December 7, 1979, autonomy was given to this court
to decide most questions of constitutionality in such a manner that, al-
though it still forms a part of the Supreme Court, it in fact has been
converted into a truly specialized constitutional court.6 9
4. Direct Constitutional Claims
Another way exists by which constitutional courts can protect human
rights, aside from a general declaration of the constitutionality of a law or
64. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA arts. 262-65, Sept. 15, 1965.
65. The Court was established in a Jan. 21, 1970 amendment to the Constitution of the
Republic of Chile of 1925.
66. CONSTITUTION OF ECUADOR arts. 140-41, Jan. 15, 1978. The Court of Constitutional
Guarantees does not have decisional powers equal to that of the National House of Repre-
sentatives or to plenary sessions of legislative committees. However, when they are not in
session, the Court can formulate observations on the conformity of legislation to the
Constitution.
67. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU arts. 298 & 299, July 12, 1979, effective July, 1980.
68. Decree No. 432 of 1969.
69. THE CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA art. 214 (as amended Dec. 4, 1979).
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by constitutional appeal. This remedy exists when a specialized constitu-
tional court of the Supreme Court accepts claims from persons whose
fundamental rights have allegedly been infringed by some official act,
particularly an administrative one.
The countries which merit special attention for providing this proce-
dure for constitutional protection of fundamental rights are Austria, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and recently Spain, which
calls the remedy "recurso de amparo" as a result of Mexican influence.
a. In the Austrian system, the Beschwerde, or complaint, emerged
during the previous century in the Constitutional Law of the Superior
Court of the Empire (Reichsgericht) on December 21, 1897 and was per-
fected by article 144 of the Constitution of 1920-29, which was re-estab-
lished in 1945.70
b. The specific instrument for protecting human rights in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany is called the Verfassungsbeschwerde, or consti-
tutional complaint. Similar institutions existed in the provincial constitu-
tions of Bavaria of 1919 and 1946, but were not provided for in the
original text of the Constitution of 1949. It was later introduced in arti-
cles 90 to 96 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court of 1951,"
and was subsequently elevated to constitutional status through the
amendment of January 29, 1969."
This petition of appeal can be presented to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court or to the state constitutional courts by any individual or
group whose fundamental constitutional rights have been affected.
Considering that the Verfassungsbeschwerde has been the method
by which more than ninety-five percent of all constitutional questions
have been brought before the Federal Constitutional Court, it is apparent
that it has assumed great importance in German constitutional law.
c. Although a specialized constitutional court has not been created
in Switzerland, article 113, paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitution of
May 29, 1874 provides for an appeal of public right (Staatsrechtliche
Beschwerde) by which any citizen can have recourse to the Federal Court.
Complaints are limited to the challenge of administrative, legislative and
judicial acts by the canton authorities when such acts infringe the funda-
mental rights recognized by the Federal Constitution or the Constitutions
of each canton.
d. The Spanish Constitution, which became effective on December
29, 1978, re-establishes the remedy of amparo that had appeared in the
Republican Constitution of 1931. This remedy is a final appeal to the
Constitutional Court available to any citizen, the Public Defender, or the
70. The Beschwerde is regulated by Arts. 82-88 of the Law on the Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz) of 1953 and its effectiveness has been amplified by the re-
cent federal law which became effective July 1, 1976.
71. Organic Law of Mar. 12, 1951 (as amended).
72. BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 93, § I, 4.2, Jan. 29, 1969.
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Attorney General.7"
The Organic Law of the Court, as well as the Constitution, recognizes
that there is no law specifically creating the action of amparo in the lower
courts. The laws require that resort be made to the amparo only after the
regular administrative adversarial process or the protective proceeding
described in the Organic Act has taken place."'
E. The Instrument of Socialist Legal Systems: The Procurator
1. Historical Background
The Procurator is not the sole agency that can be used for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights provided by the socialist constitutions.
There exists a definite remedy, such as in article 58 of the Constitution of
the U.S.S.R. of October 7, 1977, which provides that citizens whose con-
stitutional rights have been infringed may obtain judicial review25 The
Procurator has been the major source for strengthening protection of so-
cialist legality, including what we call human rights. The Procurator has
its origin in the office known as the Procurador, utilized during Czarist
times. In 1918, Lenin introduced the Procurator in its present form to
serve as an organ of control and defense of the socialist legality in the
nascent Soviet state, while the primary organic law was enacted in 1922.76
In examining the structure and function of the Procurator in the Soviet
Union, one is able to view the institution as it exists in the Communist
bloc nations.
a. Structure
In the Soviet Union, the Procurator is a very complex body, organ-
ized in a hierarchical form and headed by the Procurator General of the
U.S.S.R., who has been appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union for
a period of five years (seven years in the Constitution of 1936). The Proc-
urator is responsible only to the Supreme Soviet or, during the time be-
tween its sessions, to the Presidium.7 ' The Procurator General directs the
73. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION art. 162, §1(b), Dec. 29, 1978. For a translation of the
Constitution, see Glos, note 57 supra.
74. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, aL 201.
75. Article 58, as translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION RE-
PUBLICS: ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS (F.J.M. Feldbrugge ed. 1979), essentially provides that
citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to address complaints against the actions of officials
and of state organizations. The complaints can be brought to a court, in the manner estab-
lished by law, against actions which violate the law or exceed the authority of an official,
and which infringe the citizen's rights. There is also a right to compensation for damages
inflicted by unlawful actions of the state agencies or officials in the course of performing
their official duties.
76. See G. SMITH, THE SOVIET PROCURACY AND THE SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION 46
(1978).
77. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
arts. 165-68, Oct. 7, 1977; Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), arts. 6
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central organ, located in Moscow, which is divided into various secretari-
ats and departments for carrying out its numerous functions, including
those of the Chief Military Procuracy and the Transportation
Procuracy.7
There are three lower levels subordinate to the Procurator General,
the first of which is comprised of the Procurators of the Union Republics
and of the Autonomous Republics. Next are the Procurators of the terri-
tories, provinces, and autonomous regions, all of which are directly ap-
pointed by the Procurator General. The lowest level is comprised of the
Procurators of the autonomous areas, districts, and cities, named by the
Procurators of the Union Republics and confirmed by the Procurator
General. All of these Procurators serve for five years.
7 9
b. Functions
It is difficult to classify the function of the Soviet Procurator. He is
neither a judge nor an administrative official nor in a strict sense a public
official, but he has aspects of all of these since he gives direction to and
supervises socialist policy. 0
The Procurator has two principal functions: that of a public official,
because the Procurator has charge of criminal prosecutions as well as the
authority to impose disciplinary and administrative sanctions against offi-
cials and citizens who contravene the law,"1 and that of supervising the
prisons, with the power to order the immediate release of all persons ille-
gally detained or held without legal basis."2
Second, according to articles 22 to 25 of the Regulatory law, the
Procurator carries out what is considered the most important of its func-
tions: the supervision and enforcement of socialist policy with regard to a
great portion of public officials, social and economic organizations, and
citizens. Excluded from the Procurator's control are the highest organs of
the state, such as the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and those of the
Union and Autonomous Republics. The Council of Ministers in the local
and federal sphere (certainly with respect to individual officials), as well
& 8.
78. Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), art. 14.
79. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
arts. 16667; Organic Law of the Procurator of Nov. 30, 1979 (U.S.S.R.), arts. 7, 15 & 16.
80. Art. 164 of the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION of 1977 provides that:
The supreme supervision of the exact and uniform execution of the laws
by all the ministries, state committees, and departments, enterprises, institu-
tions and organizations, executive and administrative organs of the local Soviet
of People's Deputies; the koijoses (collective farms); cooperatives and other
social organizations, and public officials as well as citizens, is to be undertaken
by the Procurator General of the USSR and the Procurators that are
subordinate to him.
81. Regulatory Law of 1979, art. 15.
82. Id. at art. 34.
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as the Communist Party which exercises control over the activities of
Procurators, are also exempt from the scrutiny of the Procurator.
The procedures by which the Procurator General and the remaining
Procurators at various levels exercise supervision of socialist policy can be
classified in two categories. The first is the "protest," which can be de-
fined as a complaint made by a Procurator in order that an official or his
immediate superior may correct a violation or remedy an error or defi-
ciency in order to enforce socialist policy. The protest can also be brought
to the courts as a means of challenging allegedly illegal decisons8s Sec-
ond, Procurators, at their respective levels, can present a proposal or rec-
ommendation before the organs of state, public officials, or social organi-
zations, with the purpose of putting an end to violations of the law and
the causes which make such violations possible. The necessary measures
to eliminate such violations and underlying causes are taken within a pe-
riod of one month. 4 This activity can be compared to that of the
Ombudsman in Scandinavia (examined infra). As was previously men-
tioned, the Procurator system has penetrated all of the socialist legal sys-
tems inspired by the Soviet model and has been regulated in a manner
similar to that which has just been described. 5
2. Procurator General of the Republic
We refer briefly to the office of the Fiscalia Generdl (Prosecutor
General of the Republic) provided for in the Cuban Socialist Constitution
of February 24, 1976.8' This institution, clearly inspired by the Soviet
Procurator and socialist laws, was first introduced in the 1973 amend-
ments to the previous Constitution of 1959.7 In accordance with the So-
viet model, these constitutional provisions provide that the office of Pros-
ecutor General include the prosecutors (fiscalias) of the provinces,
municipalities, and the military, with the highest officials appointed by
the General Assembly of Popular Power; the next level by the Council of
State; and the lowest level by the same Prosecutor General, all for a pe-
riod of five years with possible reappointment by the appointing organs."
83. Id. at arts. 29 & 30.
84. Id. at art. 28.
85. CONSTrrTION OF ALBANIA arts. 84-88 (1946); CONsirrV'UON OF THE GERMAN DEMO-
CRATIC RmUBLIC arts. 97-98 (1967) (as amended 1974); CONSTITUTION OF BULGARIA art. 97,
para. 1 (1960) (as amended 1968); CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC O CHINA art. 43
(1978); CONSTITUTION OF HUNGARY arts. 42-44 (1954); CONSTITUTION OF POLAND arts. 45-46
(1952); and CONSTITUTION OF RUMANIA arts. 105-08 (1965).
86. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA art. 130, Feb. 24, 1976.
87. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC of 1959 (1973).
88. Law of Court Organization, arts. 106-42, Aug. 10, 1977. Authors Harold J. Bermand
and Van R. Whiting in Impressions of Cuban Law, 29 AM. J. CoMp. L. 475, 480 (1980) note:
[t]he Cuban Fiscalia Generdl must investigate and answer any complaint
whether from an individual or a government agency, within 20 days; if the Fis-
calia finds that there has been an administrative violation or deficiency, the
officials charged must correct it within 20 days or the Fiscalia will protest their
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II. THE EXECUTIVE SOLUTION: THE OMBUDSMAN
A. Overview and Background
The Ombudsman has a clearly Scandinavian origin. Its name comes
from a Swedish word that signifies representative, delegate or agent. It
usually refers to one or more officials who have been appointed, in accor-
dance with the original model, by the parliament, although there is a
growing tendency for the Ombudsman to be named by the executive
branch. The Ombudsman's principal functions are to investigate viola-
tions of fundamental rights of individuals by administrative authorities
and to propose, although without binding effect, the most effective solu-
tions to avoid or remedy these violations.
The Ombudsman emerged in the Regerisform (the Swedish constitu-
tional law on the form of government) of June 6, 1809. With antecedents
in the Chancellor of Justice, an Ombudsman was created by the Crown in
the 18th century as a representative of the king for the supervision of
administrative officials. 9 At first, the Swedish Ombudsman was chosen
by the Parliament (Riksdag) for the purpose of supervising the function
of the courts, from which it has derived its present name, Justi-
tieombudsman. Slowly, its supervision was extended to administrative
authorities and thus it remained until 1915, when an Ombudsman for
military affairs, or Militieombudsman was established.9 0 Thereafter, the
institution experienced a slow but gradual evolution so that at present it
has acquired a very complex structure.
In effect, in accordance with chapter 12, article 6 of the constitu-
tional document called the Instrument of Government, 91 there exist four
Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmen). They deal with separate matters (in-
cluding military subjects, as the Military Ombudsman was eliminated in
1967), and one of the four serves as President. 2
In Sweden there also exist two other officials, as well as a representa-
failure to do so to their superiors. The Fiscalia cannot compel an agency or
organization to change its practice; however, the authors were told that the
possibility of protest to superiors alone is usually sufficient to induce the offi-
cial to accept the Fiscalia's warning or recommendation.
Presently, the Fiscalia is regulated by Articles 130-33 of the Constitution of February
24, 1976, which provides for "a fundamental purpose, the control of the socialist legality by
supervising the organs of the state, social and economic entities, and the citizens to ensure
their strict compliance with the law and other legal requirements."
89. See A. LEGRAND, L'OMBUDSMAN SCANDINAVE; ETUDES COMPAR9ES SUR LE CONTR6LE
DE L'ADMINISTRATION 15-26 (1970).
90. See Kenkow, El Ombudsman de Asuntos Militares, in D. ROWAT, EL OMBUDSMAN:
EL DEFENSOR DEL CIUDADANO 89-97 (E. Suitrez trans. 1973).
91. Law of Court Organization, arts. 106-42, Aug. 10, 1977.
92. The article Ombudsman and Other Complaint-Handling Systems Survey in 9 IN-
TERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INSTITUTE (1979-80) states that "[e]ach (of the four) Ombudsman
has a field of supervision." Briefly, their activities are divided into criminal justice, the mili-
tary, social welfare, and general government administration.
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tive of press organizations, who have received the name of Ombudsman
because of the similarity of their powers to those possessed by the au-
thentic Parliamentary Commissioners. The first, the Ombudsman for
Protection of the Freedom of Trade, initiated its activities in 1954, for the
purpose of protecting against restrictive trade practices."' The Consumer
Ombudsman emerged in 1971 with the purpose of ensuring that such laws
as the Marketing Act, the Unfair Contract Terms Act and the Consumer
Credit Act are observed.14 Both of these officials are appointed by the
King for the Council of Ministers. Since 1959, the Ombudsman for the
press has been chosen by the journalists' organizations and has remained
independent and autonomous in carrying out its oversight of professional
ethics and the protection of individuals from invasion of privacy. An
Equality Ombudsman has also been created to prohibit discrimination
based on sex. In certain circumstances, he will be able to take a case to
court on behalf of an individual.96
B. Diffusion of the Ombudsman
In the years following World War I and more extensively after World
War II, the Ombudsman system was implemented in other Scandinavian
countries and subsequently in various Western legal systems. It has been
said that there is a true need for the establishment of the Ombudsman in
even the most diverse systems. The French writer, Andre Legrand, has
classified it as a "universal institution."9
A simple description of the accelerated development of the institu-
tion of the Ombudsman would be difficult. Solely for the purposes of this
survey, the following division of the material will be made: the remaining
Scandinavian countries; the countries of the Commonwealth; the United
States; the laws of Continental Europe; the possibility of its establish-
ment in Latin America; and finally, its emergence in developing countries.
1. Other Scandinavian Countries
In the first group of those which have been heavily influenced by the
Swedish model, the Scandinavian countries, the following is noted:
a. Finland, in obtaining its independence from Russia and in writ-
ing the Constitution of July 17, 1979, introduced the Ombudsman in arti-
- 4, AAIh. follows the Swe ih model very closely. The Ombudsman's
activities have been regulated by the law of January 10, 1920, with subse-
quent modifications.
b. By reason of the amendment to the Constitution of Denmark in
93. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 287.
94. See Stemberg, L'Ombudsman Sukdas pour les Consommateurs, REVUE INTERNA-
TIONAL DE DROIT COMPARA 577-81 (1974).
95. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 287.
96. Law of Dec. 13, 1979.
97. Legrand, supra note 89, at 3.
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1953, the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner was created in article
55,98 which establishes the organization and functions of the Ombudsman
des Foketing along the lines of the Swedish model and Finnish precedent.
c. In Norway, two Parliamentary Commissioners were established
with diverse responsibilities. The first was created to receive complaints
regarding the military (Ombudsman for Forsvaret).99  Another
Ombudsman was established to deal with civil administrative matters
(Sivil Ombudsman for Forvaltningen).'0 0 In addition, in 1973 a consumer
Ombudsman, to be appointed by the government, was created according
to the Swedish example.'
0'
Generally, in the Scandinavian countries, Ombudsmen are selected
by the Parliament (with some exceptions in Sweden and Norway), but
retain a certain autonomy. Citizens have direct access to the Ombudsmen,
and the Ombudsmen have complete authority to accept or reject petitions
and the full power to carry out all types of investigations. They can for-
mulate recommendations that are non-binding, but that are accepted in
the majority of cases by the respective officials. They must also submit
annual reports to the Parliament and, when necessary, certain special
reports.'10
2. The British Commonwealth
The Ombudsman has been established in the legal systems of the
British Commonwealth. Within this second group, the laws of the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and India have the greatest importance.
a. New Zealand
The first common-law country to establish a Parliamentary Commis-
sioner following the Scandinavian model was New Zealand, whose institu-
tion has had a considerable influence in other countries of the British
Commonwealth. The institution was introduced in legislation called the
Parliamentary Commissioner Ombudsman Act of 1962,03 culminating in
the Ombudsman Act of June 26, 1975, which entered into effect the be-
ginning of April 1976. The new law of 1975 established a collegial system
of three Ombudsmen, each with a defined territorial scope (Wellington,
Christ Church and Auckland). They are appointed by the Governor Gen-
eral at the proposal of the New Zealand Parliament for a period of three
years (which equals the term of that legislative body). They also may be
98. Ombudsman Act of Sept. 11, 1954 (amended 1959 and 1961).
99. Law of April 21, 1952 (as amended).
100. Law of June 22, 1962 (amended Mar. 22, 1968, 1980); Regulation of June 8, 1969.
101. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 292.
102. Rowat, supra note 90, at 39.
103. This act was modified in 1968, 1969, and in 1970. It later culminated in the
Ombudsman Act of June 26, 1975, effective April 1976.
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reappointed.10
b. Great Britain
The office of Ombudsman was introduced in Great Britain under a
law called The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act that
became effective April 1, 1967 for England, Wales and Scotland. 101 This
Commissioner possesses special powers by virtue of being appointed by
the Crown. At the request of the two houses of Parliament, the
Ombudsman is elected for an indefinite term. However, he must retire at
age 65. He is not subject, even indirectly, to the duration of a Parlia-
mentary appointment. In addition, what is most important is that, unlike
the Scandinavian model, this Commissioner cannot act on behalf of, nor
directly receive complaints from, citizens who have been affected by the
administrative authorities. Instead, a citizen must present his or her
claim to a member of the House of Commons, who in turn reviews it and
sends it on to the Commissioner. The Commissioner then undertakes an
investigation and formulates the pertinent recommendations which are
communicated to the member who solicited such intervention.'"
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Commissioner has played an
important part in the solution of problems emanating from government
administration. Through the National Health Services (Scotland) Act,
passed in 1972,107 and the National Health Services Act of 1973,18 a Par-
liamentary Commissioner for Health was established with jurisdiction in
England, Scotland and Wales. This Ombudsman function is carried out
as an additional activity of the Commissioner for Administration. Those
affected by the activities of public institutions, such as medical social se-
curity, can go directly to the Commissioner of Health after having gone to
their respective government agencies.109
The evolution of the British Ombudsman culminated in the estab-
lishment of the Commissioners for Local Administration, in accordance
with the Local Government Act of 1974.110 At the present time, five com-
missioners have been designated, three for England, and the other two for
Wales and Scotland. Their functions are similar to those of the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner for Administration, except that they deal with
problems arising in local government administration. A further difference
is that if citizens have first gone to their local government representative
(such as a city council member) who is obligated to receive complaints,
and the complaint is not sent on to the Commissioner, the complaining
citizen may go directly to the Commissioner to request an investigation
104. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 298.
105. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, ch. 13.
106. Id. §§ 1, 6, 7 & 10(1).
107. National Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1972, ch. 58.
108. National Health Service Reorganization Act, 1973, ch. 32.
109. Id. Pt. III, § 35.
110. Local Government Act, 1974, ch. 7.
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and to make recommendations to the appropriate authorities. " '
c. Northern Ireland
With regard to Northern Ireland (which is legislatively autonomous
from Great Britain) two parliamentary commissioners' positions were cre-
ated. The first, the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, is similar in organization and function to the Commis-
sioner in Great Britain. He can be directly approached only by members
of the Irish Parliament." 2
The second, the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, was
created for complaints against local authorities, and provides for the pos-
sibility of immediate access by those who have been injured. " 8 In accor-
dance with legislation passed in 1969, these two functions are carried out
by the same person, which is similar to the British model."
d. Australia
The Australian legal system, a federal system, has been influenced by
the New Zealand Commissioner (which is closer to the Scandinavian
model than to the British model) and has followed its essential features
with some variations. The office has been gradually established in the
Australian states as well as in the Northern Territory." 5
A federal law, the Ombudsman Act of 1976, introduced the commis-
sioner at a national level and the first Commonwealth Ombudsman initi-
ated activities upon being appointed in March 1977. The Commonwealth
Ombudsman had two assistants, one of them having jurisdiction in the
Federal Capital of Canberra, and the other in the Northern Territory un-
til 1978.116 In 1978 Australia granted legislative autonomy to the North-




Canada has experienced an evolution of this institution similar to
111. Id. Pt. III, § 26.
112. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1969 (Northern Ireland). See H. Fix Zamudio,
supra note 29, at 297.
113. Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1969 (Northern Ireland).
114. Id.
115. The Ombudsman was first established in West Australia through the Parliamen-
tary Commissioner Act of 1971, in Southern Australia by the Ombudsman Act of 1972
(amended 1974), in Victoria by the Ombudsman Act of 1973, in Queensland by the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner Act of 1974, in New South Wales by the Ombudsman Act of 1974
(amended 1976), and in the Northern Territory by the Northern Territory Ombudsman Or-
dinance of 1978 (effective Jan. 31, 1979).
116. Ombudsman Act, 1976, art. 14.
117. Ombudsman (Northern Territory) Ordinance, 1977.
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that of Australia. Due to its federal structure, the office was first estab-
lished in the provinces, beginning in New Brunswick and Alberta in 1967.
Quebec followed in 1968 with the creation of the Protecteur du Citoyen.
Nova Scotia and Manitoba established the office in 1969, and Ontario and
Newfoundland did so in 1975, the latter designating an Ombudsman in
accordance with a law first approved in 1970 but amended in 1975. Fi-
nally, British Columbia created the office by law, effective September 1,
1977.11
At the national level, various proposals have been presented for the
creation of a national Ombudsman. There has been success only in the
establishment of two officials with very specialized responsibility: the
Commissioner of Official Languages, who investigates complaints of the
failure to fulfill official requirements for the use of English and French in
public agencies; 1 9 and the Correctional Investigator, who receives com-
plaints from those detained by the federal penitentiary authorities.12
f. Israel
Israel's legal system has been greatly influenced by Anglo-American
law, and a discussion of Israeli Ombudsmen seems appropriate in this
section. In Israel the Ombudsman was established in 1971 as Controller
General, a special position within the state controller's office. 2 ' Since this
controller is appointed by the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), the
Ombudsman ought to be considered as a Parliamentary Commissioner.
The Controller General operates as commissioner for complaints from the
public and is assisted by a special unit whose director is appointed by a
Knesset committee upon recommendation of the Controller. In order to
facilitate access by citizens, who are permitted to make complaints di-
rectly to the Controller General, offices have been established in the cities
of Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.' A Soldier's Complaint Commissioner
was also appointed under the Military Justice Law of 1972 to receive
complaints from armed forces personnel. This Commissioner is appointed
by the Minister of Defense in consultation with the Minister of Justice




The Republic of India, with its federal structure, does not have the
designation of a national Parliamentary Commissioner. The institution,
with the name of Lokayuta or Upa Lokayuta, has been introduced in
118. H. Fix Zanudio, supra note 29, at 31516.
119. Official Languages Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 0-2 (1970).
120. Penitentiary Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. P-6, § 12 (1970).
121. H. Fix Zarnudio, supra note 29, at 304.
122. Id. at 30405.
123. Id. at 305.
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various states, such as Bihar (1973), Maharashtra (1971), Rajasthan
(1973) and Uttar Pradesh (1975)."24
3. The United States
The Ombudsman has emerged in diverse forms in the United States
due to the country's federal structure. Many of these agencies and their
officials have only a superficial similarity to either the basic Scandinavian
model or to one of its varieties.
In the United States, as in Canada, various proposals have been
presented to Congress to create a federal agency to function as an
Ombudsman, but as of this date, these efforts have not been successful.
In contrast, the states have been active in this area, and two types of
offices can be classified as Ombudsmen. The first contains the features of
the Parliamentary Commissioner of the Scandinavian model; the other,
which has proliferated at the local as well as at the state level, can be
characterized as an executive Ombudsman, i.e., appointed by the execu-
tive and not the legislative branch. This procedure can be explained by
considering the character of the system that exists in the United States.
The states that have introduced the institution in accordance with
the Scandinavian model are Hawaii (1967); Nebraska (1969); Iowa (1972);
New Jersey (1974); and Alaska (1975).'25 In all of them the official is ap-
pointed by and dependent upon the local legislature, although he retains
a certain autonomy. The office in these five jurisdictions is given the
power to receive complaints directly from citizens regarding the acts of
administrative authorities, and to investigate and formulate proposals or
recommendations, which have no binding effect. In addition, it must send
an annual report to the state legislature. Puerto Rico has also enacted an
Ombudsman Act (1977).1
26
The second type of Ombudsman, which is appointed by the Execu-
tive, is being created at various governmental levels throughout the
United States. A few examples are the Department of Neighborhood
Complaints in Chicago; the Office of Information and Complaints in Hon-
olulu; the Little City Hall Program in Boston, the Ombudsman of Nassau
County in New York City; the Lieutenant Governor's office in some
states; the Office of the State Citizen's Aid of Iowa; and the Ombudsman
of Oregon, which has officially been given the classic title.
4. Continental Europe
In Continental Europe, the Ombudsman has been established with
124. F. STACY, OMBUDSMEN COMPARED 231 (1978).
125. ALASKA STAT. tit. 24, ch. 55 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 8, ch. 96 (1976); IOWA
CODE ANN. ch. 601G (1934); NB. REV. STAT. §§ 818, 240 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-57G
(West Supp. 1982-83).
126. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, ch. 24, § 531 (1978).
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some variations. The Federal Republic of Germany has a national
Ombudsman for Military Matters, and in the German state of Rhineland-
Palatinate, there is an Ombudsman for Administrative Matters. In other
European nations the office carries various titles; for example, in France,
the Mediateur; in Switzerland, the Ombudsman in the Canton and city of
Zurich; the Promoter of Justice in Portugal; and the Public Defender in
Spain. This position arguably exists as well in the local laws of Catalan
and the Basque Region.
a. Federal Republic of Germany
The first country of Continental Europe to introduce the
Ombudsman according to the Scandinavian example was the Federal Re-
public of Germany, although this position dealt exclusively with military
affairs.1
97
The Parliamentary Commissioner of the Legislature of the Province
of Rhineland-Palatinate (Bidrgerbeauftragte des Landestages Rheinland
Pfalz) was established by the law of May 31, 1974 for the purpose of in-
vestigating either complaints made directly to it, or those that had been
presented to the Provincial Parliamentary Petitions Commission from
citizens of this state about local administrative authorities.
b. France
An Ombudsman of major importance in the development of this in-
stitution in Continental Europe is the French Mediateur. The special
characteristics of this office are partly a result of the semi-presidential
structure of the French Constitution of October 1958. The Mediateur is
appointed by the Executive for one term of six years under a decree is-
sued by the Council of Ministers, yet at the same time retains certain
autonomy from the government, since he cannot be dismissed except by
impeachment proceedings by the Council of State.1'28
The French have also followed the British system by declining to
permit direct claims by citizens to the Mediateur. Instead, such claims
must be made first to a member of the National Assembly or the Senate
and, if considered appropriate, will be sent to the Mediateur to carry out
an investigation and formulate the recommendations considered neces-
sary to resolve the issue. The Mediateur can also present general observa-
tions on administrative procedures in his annual report, including sugges-
tions to reform specific legislation."'9
Although the Mediateur has been received with skepticism doctri-
127. BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 45 (amended Mar. 19,
1956). This amendment introduced the Parliamentary Commissioner of Defense
(Wehrbeauftragte des Bundestages), who is regulated by the Federal Law of June 26, 1957.
128. Law No. 736, June 3, 1973, art. 2.
129. Id. arts. 6 & 14.
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nally, as well as by administrative officials, including members of the
Council of State, 130 the office has been very useful as an aid in the resolu-
tion of administrative problems and as a promoter of reforms in the pro-
vision of public services.
c. Switzerland
In Switzerland, Administrative Commissioners have been established
in the City as well as in the Canton of Zurich. The City's Commissioner
of Complaints, with the name of Beauftragte in Beschwerdensachen der
Stadt Zilrich, has been in existence since 1971 and is local in nature. He
is elected by the Municipal Council for a period of four years with the
possibility of re-election, but is autonomous from the Council as well as
from the City Government.' The cantonal legislature of Zurich on Sep-
tember 25, 1977 passed a law establishing a Parliamentary Commissioner,
who began functioning on June 5, 1978.132
d. Austria
The Austrian National Assembly approved a law creating the Volk-
sanwaltschaft (People's Advocate) which became effective July 1, 1977.
The Volksanwaltschaft is an autonomous organization comprised of three
persons and selected by the National Assembly for a period of six years to
receive complaints directly from citizens about the activities of federal
administrative authorities. "'
e. Italy
In Italy, there have been several proposals to create national and re-
gional "Civil Defenders" similar to the Scandinavian Ombudsman. Such
plans have been approved in the regions of Tuscany and Liguria8 4 as well
as in Campania,13 5 Lazio's Lombardi1
3 7 and Umbria.'8
These regional Civil Defenders are appointed by decree of the Re-
gional Council for a term of five years, with the possibility of re-election.
They have jurisdiction over complaints presented by citizens who have
come before"r'egional administrative agencies when the agency has not re-
sponded to the citizen within twenty days, or where an unsatisfactory re-
sponse has been given. "
130. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 309.
131. Id. at 313.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 312-13.
134. Laws of Jan. 21 and June 6, 1974.
135. Law of Aug. 11, 1978.
136. Law of Feb. 28, 1980.
137. Law of Jan. 18, 1980.
138. Law of Aug. 22, 1979.
139. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 314.
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f. Portugal
The first Ombudsman introduced in the Iberian peninsula was the
Portuguese Promoter of Justice under the Organic Law Decree of April
21, 1975, issued by the provisional government. Article 24 of the Consti-
tution of 1976 transformed the Promoter into a Parliamentary Commis-
sioner. In accordance with the Scandinavian model, the Commissioner is
elected by the National Assembly and citizens can present their com-
plaints directly about acts or omissions of public officials. The Commis-
sioner does not have the power to make any binding decisions, but can
make recommendations to competent bodies on how to remedy and pre-
vent further injustices. 4 0
g. Spain
The Spanish Democratic Constitution of December 29, 1978 followed
the example of Portuguese legislation and incorporated the figure of the
Public Defender in article 54. The Public Defender is a high commis-
sioner appointed by and accountable to the Cortes (legislative body), to
"protect the fundamental rights contained in Title I of the Constitution,
by supervising the functioning of the public administration." On April 6,
1981 an organic law for the actual creation of a Public Defender was ap-
proved by the Cortes.14 1 In addition, the possibility of establishing Re-
gional Defenders exists by virtue of the autonomy laws of the Basque
region and Catalonia, approved through simultaneous referendums car-
ried out October 25, 1979 and the autonomy law of Galicia, passed De-
cember 21, 1980.141
h. Centrality
Finally, it should be noted that there is some hope for the establish-
ment of a European Ombudsman. The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Community is to be chosen by direct, popular election.143 A large number
of member countries have already established the institution at a national
level. Recommendations to promote an international Ombudsman on a
community level were approved on November 29, 1974 by all the
Ombudsmen and Parliamentary Commissioners of member states of the
Council of Europe, together with experts and observers and by the Legal
Commission of the Council of Europe.:
140. The Organic Law Decree of 1975 was repealed and replaced by the Laws of No-
vember 22, 1977 and March 2, 1978.
141. H. Fix Zamudio, supra note 29, at 331.
142. Id. at 335-46.
143. Id. at 323.
144. Official Recommendation No. 757 of January 29, 1975 of the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe proposed to the Committee of Ministers that they invite
the governments of member states that have not adopted the institution to study the possi-
bility of appointing, at a national level, persons who have assumed the function of
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5. Latin America
Within Latin America, the prevailing attitude has been that an
Ombudsman, either executive or parliamentary, is an institution far re-
moved from the Latin American jurisprudential tradition, even though
the Constitutions of Portugal and Spain both provide for such an office.
It is foreseeable that a greater interest will awaken among Latin Ameri-
can jurists to study this means of protecting the rights of the governed.
It is notable that the figure of the Parliamentary Commissioner has
at least appeared in Colombian law recently, although in an indirect form.
After various projects for the creation of the classic Ombudsman with
such names as Overseer of the Administration, Parliamentary Attorney or
Defender of Human Rights were proposed, amendments to articles 142
and 143 of the Constitution by the Constitutional Reform of December 4,
1979 gave the Attorney General new power rather than creating a new
office. He is appointed for a period of four years by the House of Repre-
sentatives from among three names that are sent to that body by the
President of the Republic. Like the Scandinavian Ombudsman, he can
receive direct complaints from citizens regarding violations by officials
and public employees of human rights and social guarantees. The Attor-
ney General can carry out necessary investigations and present an annual
report to the Colombian Congress on the exercise of these functions.
An evolution has begun, however weak, to create Ombudsmen to pro-
tect the consumer. Although their activity is limited to investigating the
conduct of business and industry regarding complaints from injured con-
sumers, they may lead to the creation of more comprehensive institutions
of the sort described earlier in this study.
1 4 5
6. Developing Nations
Finally, the Ombudsman has been introduced into the legal systems
of various developing countries because of its effectiveness. A few exam-
ples include Jamaica (The Ombudsman Act, November 13, 1977), Mauri-
tius (Constitution of 1968 and Ombudsman Act of 1969), Papua New
Guinea (Ombudsman Commission, Constitution of 1979), Tanzania (a
permanent Commission of Investigations established in the Provisional
Constitution of 1965, and the Law of 1966, amended in 1975), Trinidad
and Tobago (Ombudsman regulated by articles 91 to 98 of the Constitu-
tion of March 1976) and Zambia (Commission for Investigation, Constitu-
tion of 1973).
CONCLUSION
In every country examined, no matter what political philosophy gov-
Ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner at a regional or local level.
145. Several countries have enacted laws to protect and defend the consumer: Vene-
zuela (Aug. 5, 1974), Costa Rica (Feb. 28, 1975) and Mexico (Dec. 19, 1976).
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erns, there is some provision, usually constitutional, that provides for the
protection of certain fundamental human rights. These constitutional
provisions range from the Constitution of the United States and its Bill
of Rights to the amparo provided in Latin American constitutions to the
French Constitution and the Council of State and to the Procurator of
the Soviet bloc nations. A range of variations exists but no matter what
the system, there is some provision, organized by legislation, for the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of citizens.
In turn, we have seen that each system provides a judiciary branch to
hear and decide cases of fundamental rights violations and the constitu-
tionality of laws. Furthermore, we have seen that each system has similar
instrumentalities, such as the writ of habeas corpus, by which to petition
the government and address the judiciary for redress of grievances of fun-
damental rights violations.
Finally, in addition to legislative and judicial sanctions, we are wit-
nessing an increasing role on the part of the executive branch in numer-
ous governments. This role has been most often patterned after the
Ombudsman of Scandinavia, although used in various capacities and
under a variety of guises. The Ombudsman model seems to be one that is
readily adaptable to diverse situations, political orientations and multifa-
rious tasks of government in pursuit of the protection of fundamental
human rights. The role of the Ombudsman has proven adaptable to di-
verse tasks and governmental functions from Scandinavia to Tanzania.
The fact that so many developing countries are using the Ombudsman
model clearly demonstrates its remarkable flexibility. As a result of this
global survey, we may obtain a better perspective of the most effective
and expedient means for the protection and resolution of fundamental
rights violations, namely the pursuit of domestic remedies rather than the
more idealistic and cumbersome methods of external world pressure cur-
rently advocated.
ADDENDUM
Since the time when this paper was first submitted, several modifica-
tions and amendments of the laws mentioned within have occurred,
which is to be expected with a subject as dynamic as governmental insti-
tutions for the protection of human rights. Briefly, we shall point out just
the most important reforms.
A. In relation to the special system in Latin America:
1. Two new laws of amparo have been passed: a Nicaraguan law,
enacted May 28, 1980 and the Peruvian Law of Habeas Corpus and
Amparo, promulgated Dec. 7, 1982 and published the following day in El
Peruano.
In spite of the new Constitution of Honduras, enacted by Decree
Number 131 of January 11, 1982, the Law of Amparo of April 14, 1933 is
still in force, although amended in January, 1982, because the new consti-
tution regulates the amparo in the same manner as the former
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consitutions.
2. The Chilean military government established an instrument for
the protection of fundamental human rights, called recurso de protecci6n,
which is regulated by the Constitution of 1925. The new recurso de pro-
tecci6n was enacted by Institutional Act Number 3, published September
13, 1976, and is regulated by the Supreme Court of Justice judicial pro-
ceeding (Auto Acordado), published April 12, 1977; this remedy was in-
corporated into article 20 of the Constitution, passed by the plebiscite on
September 11, 1980 and enacted on October 21, 1980. A full treatment of
this topic may be found in the interesting book of the Chilean jurist
Eduardo Soto Kloss, EL RECUSRSO DE PROTECCI6N, ORIGENES, DOCTRINA Y
JURISPRUDENCIA (Santiago 1982).
B. There has been an important development in the continental Euro-
pean system of constitutional courts as embodied in the Latin American
constitutional courts:
1. The Constitutional Court established in the Republic of Chile by
the 1970 amendment to the Constitution of 1925 was abolished by the
military coup of September, 1973; however, it was restored with similar
characteristics by articles 81 to 83 of the Constitution passed by the pleb-
iscite on September 11, 1980. Although the legislative body has remained
suspended by the Transitory Arrangements of the same Constitution, the
Court has been established according to its Organic Law enacted by the
Governmental Junta on May 12, 1981, published May 19, 1981 in the
Diario Oficial.
2. The Court of Constitutional Guarantees, established by articles
296 and 297 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1979, was created by its Or-
ganic Law, enacted by the Congress of the Republic on May 19, 1982 and
published the following day in El Peruano.
3. The Ecuadorean Court of Constitutional Guarantees was also re-
formed through the constitutional amendments published on September
1, 1983, which, inter alia, added article 141 of the Constitution of Janu-
ary, 1978 in order to encourage the functioning of the Court. Article 141
treats as an offense any contempt of the Court's unconstitutional law dec-
larations and any violation of human rights. These amendments will be in
force beginning August 10, 1984.
4. There have also been important reforms in the Portuguese sys-
tem of constitutional justice through the constitutional amendments en-
acted September 24, 1982 and published September 30, 1982 in the
Diario Rep~lblica. These amendments abolished the Council of the
Revolution, which had a military character, and its advisory body, the
Constitutional Commission. The new articles 284 and 285 established a
Constitutional Court, comprised of thirteen justices, ten of whom are to
be chosen by the Assembly of the Republic and the remaining three to be
appointed by the Court itself. The Constitutional Court is empowered
with the function of constitutional control, which formerly belonged to
the abolished bodies.
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5. Changes have also occurred within the socialist countries. Follow-
ing the example of the specialized courts of Yugoslavia (which are actu-
ally functioning) and of Czechoslovakia (which were established by the
consitutional amendment of 1968, but which are still lacking the neces-
sary organic law), the People's Republic of Poland established a Constitu-
tional Court by the constitutional amendment of March 26, 1982, which
reformed articles 30 and 33 and added articles 33a and 33b. The essential
function of the Court is to make binding decisions regarding the compati-
bility between laws and the general decrees of the Constitution. As in
Czechoslovakia, however, the necessary organic law for this judicial body
has not yet been passed.
